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The Marriage Tax: A Social and Fiscal Policy Reversal for U.S. Family Taxation 
A.J. Cataldo II Kevin Flynn  John S. DeJoy 
 
Abstract 
Cataldo and Flynn (2014) provided a historical review (1913-) of the marriage tax penalty (MTP) 
and marriage tax bonus (MTB) that is created in the current income tax system that exists in the 
United States.  In addition, Cataldo and Flynn (2014) summarized significant comparative 
studies for Canada, England and Wales through the 1990s, and described U.S. fiscal and tax 
policy reforms (2001, 2003 and 2004) that minimized or eliminated the U.S. MTP.  The 
American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 reverses U.S. tax policy, resurrecting concerns 
about the MTP for higher income taxpayers. 
We extend our previous work by comparing the U.S. marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratio to the 
Canadian M-T-D ratio.  The family remains the unit of taxation in the U.S. tax code, thus 
creating the potential for the marriage tax.  However, the individual remains the unit of taxation 
in Canada, thus preventing the existence of the marriage tax.  This is a timely and interesting 
analysis because by comparing the M-T-D ratio in the U.S. where the marriage tax exists, to the 
M-T-D ratio in Canada where the marriage tax does not exist, we can determine whether the 
marriage tax has a significant effect on a couple’s decision to either marry, or stay married.  
Those researching family taxation and policy issues, both within and outside of North America, 
may find it helpful to exploit this alternative dimension for comparison and international 
analysis.   
Key words: marriage tax, marriage, divorce 
 
Introduction 
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 20121 has resurrected concerns about the marriage tax 
penalty (MTP).  Previously, Economic Growth and Tax Relief (EGTRRA 2001), Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation (JGTRRA 2003), and Working Families Tax Relief Acts 
(WFTRA 2004) completely eliminated “base” effects-based MTPs (2003-) and reduced “rate” 
effects-based MTPs.  The latter was achieved through an expansion of the 15 percent bracket 
(2004). 
The U.S. MTP was operationally defined and associated with the establishment of separate tax 
rate tables (“rate” effect), first established for single and married taxpayers for post-1970 tax 
years.  A difference in the personal exemption and standard deduction amount (“base” effect) 
available to single and married taxpayers also resulted in MTPs and marriage tax bonuses 
(MTBs), but this component of marriage tax penalties, bonuses and non-neutrality was 
completely eliminated for post-2002 tax years.2 
Brozovsky and Cataldo (1994) examined combined “rate” and “base” effects and calculated 
MTP and MTB ranges in their analysis of the entire history of individual Federal income 
taxation in the U.S.  Cataldo and Flynn (2014) used the 2001 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
                                                            
1
 Pub.L. 112–240, H.R. 8, 126 Stat. 2313, enacted January 2, 2013, was passed by the United States Congress on 
January 1, 2013, and was signed into law by President Barack Obama the next day. 
2
 This component of the MTP arose from differing personal exemptions (1913 through 1943) and standard 
deductions (1944 through 2002).  During this period, standard deductions amounts were purely variable (1944 
through 1963), semi-variable or mixed (1964 through 1976), and purely fixed (1977 through 2002).  The Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) increased the basic standard deduction amount for 
married taxpayers to double the amount available to single taxpayers for the 2003 and 2004 tax years.  It was 
extended by the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA) from 2005 through 2008 tax years. 
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Statistics of Income (SOI) public use file to assist them in extending this methodology and these 
measures through 2013.  With a single exception, academic research results suggests that tax 
penalties associated with the decision to marry, remain married, or divorce have affected the 
timing, but not the incidence of marriage in the U.S., Canada, and England/Wales. 
We extend Cataldo and Flynn (2014) from a U.S. tax-based focus to a U.S.-Canadian (North 
American) marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratio-based focus.  The U.S. system of individual 
taxation taxes the household.  The Canadian system of taxation taxes the individual.  Therefore, 
to the extent that M-T-D ratios between the U.S. and Canada are comparable, the decision or 
marry, remain married, or divorce evolves from some non-tax or fiscal policy related variable. 
While we expand our investigations to North America, where the American unit of taxation was 
(and remains) the household and the Canadian unit of taxation was (and remains) the individual, 
we do not extend our investigations to other countries.  As of 1989 (an approximate mid-point 
for the period examined), the Canadian unit of taxation feature is one shared with Australia, 
Denmark, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K.  The American unit of taxation feature 
was shared with France and Germany.  However, France and Germany used single tax rates 
schedules.  The U.S. system is the only one of the above that both (1) defined the unit of taxation 
as the household and (2) used separate or multiple tax rate schedules for the single and married 
(filing jointly) filing statuses.  The result is the U.S. tax tables or tax rate effect-based marriage 
tax. 
We extend and examine M-T-Ds developed by Cataldo and Savage (2001).  Canada does not 
have a marriage tax, per se, but enjoys an M-T-D ratio only slightly greater than that for the U.S. 
for the post-1986 period.  The comparability between U.S. and Canadian M-T-Ds and recent 
research results suggest that cohabitation and changing social trends may represent more 
significant factors than the marriage tax in future studies of the decision to marry, remain 
married, separate, and divorce in North America. 
The remainder of this paper is organized, as follows:  Before introducing M-T-D ratios, 
comparisons, and analysis, we provide a very brief summary of prior research, where, like 
Cataldo and Flynn (2014), we used Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) 
data (1989 and 2001) to focus on the most significant MTPs.  We provide a brief review of the 
literature on the incidence and timing of the decision to marry, and develop comparative U.S. and 
Canadian M-T-D ratio measures, where we examine the impact of U.S. tax legislation designed 
to mitigate MTPs, including and controlling for U.S. MTPs.  Our statistical results suggest that 
U.S. and Canadian fiscal and tax policy may have played a less significant role in the decision to 
marry, remain single, or divorce in North America.  Instead, the increased correlation between 
U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratios may be a function of the changing definition of the family and 
social trends.  Finally, we summarize our results, recommending the extension of our 
methodology to countries outside of North America. 
 
I. Prior Research, Using IRS SOI Data and Focused on Significant MTPs 
Table I provides a broad summary of the five most prevalent and/or significant U.S. MTPs, 
provided in the same sequence and framework used in a U.S. Form 1040 – the income tax form 
used by individual U.S. taxpayers.  They were described and illustrated by Cataldo and Flynn 
(2014).  They are bolded and italicized in Table 1, and include: (1) the net capital loss (NCL) 
ceiling or limitation of $3,000 per tax return, where two single taxpayers might generate a tax 
deduction of up to $6,000; (2) Social Security benefits, where married taxpayers receive lower 
amounts of old age, survivors and disability income (OASDI) and are taxed more heavily, when 
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compared to two, single taxpayers, preferring to simply live together, outside of marriage; (3) 
standard deductions available to married taxpayers, which is less than two times the amount 
available to two single taxpayers (the “base” effect); (4) differing tax rates and tax rates tables, 
penalizing married taxpayers (the “rate” effect); and (5) the imposition of the alternative 
minimum tax (AMT), which also negatively impacts married taxpayers.  This table should assist 
others in conducting international comparisons.  U.S. tax law specifically targeted U.S. MTPs for 
reduction and/or elimination in legislation from 2001, 2003 and 2004, as noted in Table 1. 
Refer Table I 
Table II provides descriptive measures of the percentage of U.S. taxpayers impacted by the same 
five most prevalent MTPs described by Cataldo and Flynn (2014) and addressed above, by 
adjusted gross income (AGI) class, and using the same 1989 and 2001 IRS SOI data.  Peak 
measures are bolded, italicized and highlighted for emphasis.  Note that the base (68%) and rate 
(85%) effect-based MTPs impacted the largest percentage of U.S. taxpayers, but for taxpayers in 
different AGI classes.  The broad impact of the base and rate effect-based MTPs illustrates the 
legislative motivation to reduce the impact of these MTPs.  As noted in Table I, this legislation 
mitigated these broad-based MTPs during 2001, 2003, 2004 and later tax years. 
Refer Table II 
Table III summarizes additional, less consequential MTPs, by U.S. Internal Revenue Code 
Section (IRC§), and not addressed by Cataldo and Flynn (2014) or in the present study.  They are 
classified by low-, middle-, and high-income taxpayer classes. 
Refer Table III 
Generally, marriage tax penalties and marriage tax bonuses have been computed by simulating 
and estimating these measures through (1) the marriage of single taxpayers (SGL) or (2) the 
divorce of married taxpayers, filing jointly (MFJ), as illustrated in equation [1], below: 
[SGL x 2] – MFJ = Marriage Tax Penalty/(Bonus)          [1] 
Cataldo and Flynn (2014) computed their MTPs and MTBs, by using historical measures of AGI 
class, at first quartile, weighted average, and third quartile AGI levels.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
range of penalties and bonuses associated with marriage for an entire century (1914 through 
2013). 
Figure 1 provides reference points for the historical expansion of the U.S. MTP (1971-).  It also 
illustrates reference points for legislation providing for mitigation of the MTP, through what was 
known as a two-earner deduction (1982 through 1986; also referenced in Table I).  This “above-
the-line” deduction reduced both base and rate effect-based MTPs.  Finally, Figure 1, provides 
reference points for the post-2003 elimination of the base effect-based MTP (also referenced in 
Table I). 
Refer Figure 1 
 
II. Effects of MTPs on the Timing and Incidence of Marriage 
As noted by Cataldo and Flynn (2014), several studies examined the effect of MTPs on the 
timing and incidence of marriage.  There was quite a bit of evidence that the MTP affected the 
timing of marriage in the U.S. (Sjoquist and Walker 1995 and Alm and Whittington 1995), but 
Gelardi (1996) produced evidence that MTPs also affected the timing of marriage outside of the 
U.S. (Canada, England and Wales).  Only Alm and Whittington (1995) produced evidence that 
MTPs impacted the incidence of marriage.  Gelardi (1996) examined actual marriage and divorce 
rates (Canada; 1950 through 1991 and England and Wales; 1960 through 1991), which we, also, 
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examine, but by way of a U.S.-Canadian comparison.  The results from these MTP-specific 
studies are consistent with non-MTP-related or general studies on taxation: 
…evidence about the economic response to tax reform suggests a hierarchy of 
responses...(s)tanding at the top of the hierarchy…is the timing (emphasis added) 
of economic transactions…(Slemrod 1990, 8-9) 
 
The above studies supported the existence of this hierarchy (Trezevant 1994, 79, referring to 
Slemrod 1990, 8-9).  The use of actual marriage and divorce rates by Alm and Whittington 
(1995) and Gelardi (1996) motivated Cataldo and Savage (2001) to develop and examine actual 
marriage and divorce rates in the form of a marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratio, which we extend 
and examine through the remainder of this paper. 
 
III. Data and Methodology: The Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D) Ratio 
In the United States, the unit of taxation is the family or household, through optional joint or 
separate filing for married taxpayers.  In Canada, the unit of taxation is the individual.  Canada 
does not have a marriage tax and their system of individual income taxation is marriage neutral. 
We used the annual IRS SOI, Canada Year Book and its American counterpart, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States to capture marriage, divorce and U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
measures used for longitudinal regression model development.  Both U.S. and Canadian M-T-D 
ratios are provided for 1971 through 2008 (N = 38).3  These measures are summarized in Table 
IV.  We computed marriage-to-divorce ratios, using equation [2], as follows: 
Marriages ÷ Divorces = Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D) Ratio                      [2] 
Refer Table IV 
We should note that there is a trend, in both Canada and the U.S., to stop producing annual 
measures for marriage and divorce.  In Canada, these measures will not be produced post-2008.  
In the U.S., these measures are no longer being produced for a relatively large U.S. state (e.g., 
California, post-2001).  This data is costly to produce and the changing definition of the family 
and increased incidence of same sex marriages, in North America, have, apparently, led policy 
makers to place less emphasis on the importance of, and production of, these traditional 
measures or operational definition of “family.” 
Table IV contains M-T-D ratios for both the U.S. and Canada for the 1971 though 2008 calendar 
years.  Recall that 1971 is the first year when MTPs based on separate tax rates and tax rates 
tables were established for single and married taxpayers (see Figure 1) and both rate and base 
effect-based MTPs were mitigated by using a two-earner deduction for the 1982 through 1986 
tax and calendar years (see Table I and Figure 1). Therefore, we produce four partitions for the 
1971 through 2008 period under review, as follows: (1) 1971 through 1981 - the period where 
MTPs are imposed by way of separate tax rates tables for single and married taxpayers; (2) 1982 
through 1986 – the period where both rate and base effect-based MTPs were mitigated with the 
two-earner deduction (also known as the U.S. Schedule W and highlighted in the table); (3) 1987 
through 2002 – the period after the failure to extend the two-earner deduction, post-1986; and (4) 
2003 through 2008 – the remainder of the period of marriage and divorce data availability for the 
U.S. and Canada, after the elimination of the base effect-based MTP (highlighted in the table). 
 
 
 
                                                            
3
 A comparable graphic, but only for 1971 through 1997, is provided in Cataldo and Savage (2001, 79). 
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IV. Pearson Product Moment Correlations – U.S. and Canadian M-T-D Ratios 
We use Table V to present the results of Pearson product moment correlations between U.S. and 
Canadian M-T-Ds for the entire period under review (N=38 for 1971 through 2008) and for all 
four partitions developed and illustrated in Table IV.  We have retained the highlighting feature, 
to link Table IV to Table V data and facilitate comparison. 
Refer Table V 
Results for the four partitions follow: (1) 1971 through 1981 - the period where MTPs are 
imposed by way of separate tax rate tables for single and married taxpayers (n=11; r=0.982 and 
significant at the 0.0001 level); (2) 1982 through 1986 – the period where both rate and base 
effect-based MTPs were targeted for mitigation with the two-earner deduction (also known as 
the U.S. Schedule W and highlighted in the table; n=5; r=0.785 and not significant at any 
reasonable level); (3) 1987 through 2002 – the period after the failure to extend legislation for 
the two-earner deduction, post-1986 (n=16; r=0.498 and significant at the 0.05 level); and (4) 
2003 through 2008 – the remainder of the period of marriage and divorce data availability for the 
U.S. and Canada, after the elimination of the base effect-based MTP (highlighted in the table; 
n=6; r=0.279 and not significant at any reasonable level). 
The highest correlation between U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratios is highest during the 1971 
through 1981 and 1987 through 2002 periods or partitions (see Tables IV and V).  Those two 
partitions or periods, presumed, based on U.S. tax legislation, to have targeted and eliminated 
U.S. MTPs may, in fact, have had some impact, as the 1982 through 1986 and 1987 through 
2002 period U.S.-Canadian M-T-Ds or partitions are not correlated.  Alternatively, when viewing 
the entire period (1971 through 2008), U.S.-Canadian M-T-D ratios are highly correlated 
(r=0.736) and quite significant (p<0.0001).  We also examine the data contained in Table IV in 
regression equation form. 
Equations [3a] and [3b] are designed to examine the dependence of U.S. M-T-D ratios on 
Canadian M-T-D ratios, first, by controlling for “base” effects and the U.S. Schedule W or “two 
earner” deduction, and second, by ignoring these American fiscal policy efforts to mitigate MTP, 
as follows: 
M-T-DU.S. = β0 + β1MARCAN + β2BaseMTPU.S. + β3SchWU.S. + ε  [3a] 
        (+)        (-)          (-) 
M-T-DU.S. = β0 + β1MARCAN + ε       [3b] 
        (+) 
Our prediction is that U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratios are positively correlated in both equations 
[3a] and [3b].  In the case of equation [3a], we predict that the post-2002 elimination of the 
“base” effect-based U.S. MTP (BaseMTPU.S.) and the “two earner” deduction or U.S. Schedule 
W, present for 1982 through 1986) (SchWU.S.), are inversely correlated (see Tables IV and V and 
Figure 1).  Regression results are summarized in Table VI, where all results are consistent with 
those predicted. 
Refer Table VI 
Table VI results suggest that 52.9 percent of the U.S. M-T-D ratio is explained by the Canadian 
M-T-D ratio.  Inclusion of the BaseMTP and SchW independent variables, both designed to 
reduce the marriage tax, produce an additional 14 percent of explanatory power to the regression 
model (see Tables IV and V and Figure 1). 
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Elimination of the base MTP, as a fiscal policy measure designed to mitigate the marriage tax, 
was statistically significant.  The 1982 through 1986 establishment of a deduction for “two 
earners” did not produce a statistically significant impact on the U.S. M-T-D ratio.  A simple 
graphic provides additional insights into the U.S.-Canadian trend or pattern in marriage and 
divorce. 
Figure 2 provides for a graphic of U.S.-Canadian M-T-D ratios for 1971 through 2008.  Note that 
the decline in the U.S. M-T-D ratio stabilized, and has remained reasonably stable at a ratio 
approximating 2-to-1, after full implementation of this first tax “rate”-based MTP (1971 through 
1976).  The Canadian M-T-D ratio first declines to/below already stabilized levels for the U.S. 
for 1987 and future years.4  The fact that Canada does not have a MTP, per se, may explain why 
public policy researchers interested in family taxation issues and attempting to quantify the 
impact of fiscal policy-based MTPs, in the past, have found it difficult to quantify the impact of 
tax law on the incidence of marriage. 
 
V. Social Trends 
The comparability between U.S. and Canadian marriage-to-divorces and recent research results 
suggest that cohabitation and changing social trends may represent more significant factors than 
marriage tax penalties in future studies of the decision to marry, remain married, or divorce.  For 
example, the contemporary earned income tax credit (EITC) was examined by Dickert-Conlin 
and Houser (2002, p 25).  They found that “those facing larger increases in their EITC were less 
likely to remain married, found no relationship between the EITC and marriage for unmarried 
women, and concluded that the EITC expansion during the early- to mid-1990s had little or no 
effect on marriage decisions.” 
The conclusions reached by Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002) provide additional support to a 
(still) growing body of evidence.  The contemporary U.S. experience of the past few decades, 
characterized by declining marriage/increasing divorce rates, is not a function of the expansion 
of the EITC or economics.  It is a phenomenon related to changing social trends, including 
cohabitation (Alm, Thacher and Whittington 1999; Dickert-Conlin, Houser and Li 2002). 
Cataldo and Savage (2001, p 77) addressed these changing social trends.  “The post-World War 
II period enjoyed an increased female presence in the labor force, broad use of newly developed 
birth control measures, endorsed by the U.S. National Council of Churches (1961), rising 
feminism and the establishment of the National Organization for Women (NOW, 1963), the 
Equal Pay Act (1963), the Civil Rights Act (1964), gay rights activism, and U.S. legalization of 
abortion by the Supreme Court (1973).”  In recent years, legislation and issues related to same 
sex marriages have been addressed in the popular press. 
The…marriage penalty gained notoriety…when the news media published 
stories…married couples…were divorcing near the end of the year so they could 
file tax returns as unmarried individuals…then remarry early in the following year 
(Strefeler 1982, 5). 
After more than three decades and several published studies attempting to causally link the U.S. 
marriage tax penalty with declining marriage and increasing divorce rates, only one study found 
evidence connecting the marriage tax penalty with the incidence of marriage and divorce (Alm 
and Whittington 1995).  However, that study plus a study examining a comparable time period 
                                                            
4
 Though likely to be coincidental, this post-1986 period of greater U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratio comparability 
coincides with the 1985-1986 Canadian tax law change designed to eliminate the tax benefits associated with fiscal 
year-end marriages (Gelardi 1996). 
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(Sjoquist and Walker 1995) found that taxes affected both the timing of the decision to marry and 
divorce in the U.S., and the timing of the decision to marry and divorce in Canada and 
England/Wales (Gelardi 1996). 
VI. Summary 
We provide an extension to Cataldo and Flynn (2014), providing a framework for the most 
prevalent marriage tax penalties under U.S. tax law and summarizing fiscal policy changes 
designed to reduce these MTPs (Table I).  Table II contained additional, descriptive measures, 
using the same data base used by Cataldo and Flynn, for ease of comparison and continuity.  We 
noted less significant MTPs in Table III.  The range for American MTPs and MTBs for an entire 
century (1914 through 2013), for first and third quartile and weighted-average U.S. adjusted 
gross income levels, and referencing two pieces of legislation specifically designed to mitigate or 
reduce tax penalties associated with the decision to marry or remain married has been provided. 
Tables IV, V and VI provided the raw data and statistical results and comparisons between U.S. 
and Canadian marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratios.  We find that U.S. fiscal policy changes 
and/or tax legislation designed to mitigate or reduce MTPs produce less explanatory power, 
when compared to Canadian M-T-D ratios.  Since Canada taxes the individual and not the 
family, and does not have, and never has had, a penalty associated with the decision to marry or 
remain married, we anticipate little or no impact from the resurrection of the new U.S. marriage 
tax. 
The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 reverses U.S. tax policy, resurrecting 
concerns about the MTP for higher income taxpayers.  North American changes in social trends 
suggest that the decision to marry, remain married, divorce or select cohabitation as an 
alternative to marriage will continue to contribute complexity to the study of family taxation 
issues.  The post-1986 comparability between U.S. and Canadian marriage-to-divorce ratios, 
where no marriage tax, per se, exists under the Canadian system of individual taxation, supports 
the changing social trend explanation for these decisions, as the composition and operational 
definitions of both U.S. and Canadian households and family continues to change.  An extension 
of our methodology and the examination of this issue for other countries will provide insights 
into both North American and non-North American decisions to marry or remain married. 
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Table I: The Calculation of Taxable Income and Tax in the U.S. Selected Marriage Tax Penalty 
(MTP) Components 
  MTP Description 
Gross Income includes 
NCL Net Capital Loss ceiling/annual limitation per household 
SS Social Security 
Less:   Adjustments to Income5 
Equals:  Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 
Less:   Personal Exemptions 
Less:  BASE Standard Deduction6 
Equals:  Taxable Income 
 
  RATE Tax Rates Tables 
  AMT Alternative Minimum Tax 
Equals:  Tax7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
5
 The two-earner deduction (Schedule W) was available as an adjustment to income for the 1982 through 1986 tax 
years. 
6
 Taxpayers with itemized deductions in excess of the standard deduction (i.e., excess itemized deductions), an 
amount based on the taxpayer’s household status, is permitted to deduct the larger of their standard or itemized 
deductions. 
7
 The taxpayer pays the larger of tax based on tax rates tables or their alternative minimum tax. 
Marriage Tax Penalty (MTP) components, specifically 
targeted for reduction and/or elimination by the 
• Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 
(EGTRRA), 
• Jobs Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 
(JGTRRA), and 
• Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 
(WFTRA). 
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Table II: Percentage of Taxpayers Affected by Marriage Tax Penalty Type and Adjusted Gross 
Income (AGI) Class (2001 & 1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 NCL  SS  Base  Rate  AMT  
AGI Class 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 2001 1989 
$1K-$10K 20% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 93% 1% 0% 
$11K-$20K 16% 2% 0% 0% 32% 0% 0% 87% 0% 0% 
$21K-$30K 14% 2% 14% 5% 68% 0% 0% 76% 0% 0% 
$31K-$40K 16% 2% 22% 10% 63% 0% 0% 61% 0% 0% 
$41K-$50K 15% 2% 20% 10% 57% 49% 16% 42% 1% 0% 
$51K-$75K 19% 3% 18% 3% 41% 92% 53% 23% 2% 0% 
$76K-
$100K 25% 6% 0% 0% 24% 98% 84% 11% 6% 2% 
$101K-
$200K 33% n.a. 0% n.a. 15% n.a. 85% n.a. 13% n.a. 
Overall 23% 3% 8% 5% 34% 37% 47% 53% 5% 0% 
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Table III: Additional MTP Components by U.S. Internal Revenue Code Section (IRC§)1 
IRC§ Provision 
 
 
Phase-out Levels for Low-Income Taxpayers: 
21 30% Dependent Care Credit 
22 Elderly Credit 
32 EIC (no child) 
32 EIC (1 child) 
32 EIC (2 or more children) 
  
Phase-out Levels for Middle-Income Taxpayers: 
219 IRA Deduction 
221 Education Interest Expense 
  
Phase-out Levels for High-Income Taxpayers: 
24 Child Credit 
25A Hope & Lifetime Learning Credit 
23&137 Adoption Credit & Exclusion 
135 EE Bond Interest Exclusion 
151 Personal Exemption 
219(g)(7) IRA w/Spouse w/Retirement Plan 
408A Roth IRA Deduction 
408A IRA to Roth IRA Rollover 
469(i) $25K Rent Passive Loss 
469(i) Passive Rehabilitation Credit 
530 Education IRA Deduction 
  
Other:  
67 2% Floor – Misc. Item. Deds. 
121 Principal Residence Exclusion 
143 Recapture of Subsidy – Mtg. Bonds 
151 Casualty & Theft Loss 
213 7.5% Floor on Medical Expenses 
469 Passive Activity Rental Real Estate 
1400C Homebuyer Credit for D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1
 As adapted from Brazelton (2002). 
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Table IV: U.S. & Canadian Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D), Standard Deduction or Base Marriage 
Tax Penalty (BaseMTP), and U.S. Schedule W (SchW) Measures 1971 through 2008 (N=38) 
 
YEAR 
M-T-
DU.S. 
M-T-
DCAN BaseMTP SchW 
1971 2.8331 6.3667 $1,050 0.00 
1972 2.7006 6.2500 $925 0.00 
1973 2.4962 5.3784 $1,057 0.00 
1974 2.2825 4.4222 $1,117 0.00 
1975 2.0782 3.8824 $980 0.00 
1976 1.9898 3.5741 $926 0.00 
1977 1.9963 3.4000 $802 0.00 
1978 2.0195 3.2632 $745 0.00 
1979 1.9738 3.1864 $672 0.00 
1980 2.0101 3.0806 $591 0.00 
1981 1.9967 2.7941 $534 0.00 
1982 2.0991 2.6857 $504 0.05 
1983 2.1123 2.6812 $488 0.10 
1984 2.1189 2.8615 $468 0.10 
1985 2.0277 2.9677 $467 0.10 
1986 2.0433 2.2564 $478 0.10 
1987 2.0609 1.8958 $471 0.00 
1988 2.0531 2.2381 $343 0.00 
1989 2.0769 2.3580 $327 0.00 
1990 2.0668 2.4103 $326 0.00 
1991 1.9975 2.2338 $328 0.00 
1992 1.9440 2.0886 $347 0.00 
1993 1.9663 2.0385 $337 0.00 
1994 1.9832 2.0253 $342 0.00 
1995 1.9983 2.0513 $333 0.00 
1996 2.0383 2.1806 $336 0.00 
1997 2.0499 2.3731 $354 0.00 
1998 2.2174 2.6540 $349 0.00 
1999 2.1963 2.5074 $341 0.00 
2000 2.2123 2.2123 $342 0.00 
2001 2.0618 2.0621 $344 0.00 
2002 2.2432 2.0916 $340 0.00 
2003 2.2457 2.0810 $0 0.00 
2004 2.2717 2.0999 $0 0.00 
2005 2.2197 2.0753 $0 0.00 
2006 2.1369 2.0153 $0 0.00 
2007 2.1390 2.0358 $0 0.00 
2008 2.0536 2.0973 $0 0.00 
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Table V: Pearson Product Moment Correlation Measures between U.S. & Canadian Marriage-to-
Divorce (M-T-D) Ratios for the Entire Population & Four Partitions 1971 through 2008 (N=38) 
(developed from data contained in Table IV) 
 
Number of Observations N=38 = n=11 n=5 n=16 n=6 
Reason for Partition    
Schedule 
W  
No Base 
MTP 
Years in Partition 
[1971-
2008]  
[1971-
1981] 
[1982-
1986] 
[1987-
2002] [2003-2008] 
       
M-T-DU.S. x M-T-DCAN       
Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation 0.736*  0.982* 0.169 0.498* 0.279 
P-Value 0.000  0.000 0.785 0.050 0.592 
 
 
Table VI: Results for Regression Equations [3a] and [3b] Coefficients, Signs, and Summarized 
Results 1971 through 2008 (N=38) 
 
Description 
Equation 
[3a] 
Equation 
[3a] Summarized Results 
    
Intercept 1.6755 1.7794 Sign and coefficient not predicted. 
    
Variables:    
M-T-DCAN 0.2508 0.1253 
Positive sign, as predicted, and significant at the 
0.01% level. 
BaseMTP -0.0005  
Negative sign, as predicted, and significant at the 
0.01% level. 
SchW -0.1403  Negative sign, as predicted, but not significant. 
    
Adjusted R-Square 76.9% 52.9% 
Approximately 14% of M-T-DU.S. is not predicted by 
M-T-DCAN. 
Overall F-Statistic 41.99 42.49 Significant at the 0.01% level. 
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Figure 1: Range of the Combined Base- and Rate-Based Marriage Tax Bonus/(Penalty) in 
Nominal Dollars for 1st Quartile-, Weighted-Average- and 3rd Quartile-Based AGIs for 100 
Years - 1914 through 2013 
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Figure 2: Comparison: U.S. (US) & Canadian (CAN) Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D) Ratios 1971 
through 2008 (N=38) (developed from data contained in Table IV) 
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